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Giving Substance to the Bonus Rule in
Corporate Reorganizations: The Investment
Value Doctrine Analogy*
When a relatively large corporation is insolvent,' the only prac-
tical course of action short of liquidation 2 may be for it to enter
bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.2
Since Chapter X reorganization is a product of the Depression era, 4
it is not surprising that it consists largely of doctrinal matters settled
long before 1950. 5 But a longstanding criticism has been energetically
revived in the recent report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws.6 The report charged that the Chapter X process consistently
undercompensates junior security holders.7 The Bankruptcy Commis-
* The author wishes to thank Professor Marvin A. Chirelstein for his assistance in the
formulation and preparation of this Note.
1. Insolvency has two meanings: a corporation may be insolvent in either the bank-
ruptcy sense-assets are less than liabilities-or in the equity sense-assets are worth more
than liabilities but, due to a lack of liquidity, the corporation cannot meet its debts as
they mature. H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUCALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 627-28 (3d ed.
1955); G. HIRSCH, BANKRUPTCY 19-20 (1964).
2. H. GUTIIMANN & H. DOUCALL, supra note I, at 688:
The term liquidation is applied when the business is wound tip and the assets are
converted into cash or securities (as in the case of the sale of assets to another concern
in return for its securities), which are distributed to the owners and creditors. Liquida-
tion is usually the result of a financial condition which no treatment, mild or drastic,
can remedy.
See generally 2 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1414-16 (5th ed. 1953).
3. Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
4. Section 77B, the predecessor of Chapter X, was originally regarded as emergency
legislation. Hearings on the Revision of the Bankruptcy Act Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937).
5. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. DlBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). See generally Brudney, The Investment-Value
Doctrine and Corporate Readjustments, 72 HARv. L. REv. 645, 648 (1959).
6. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. The Commis-
sion on Bankruptcy Laws was created by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84
Stat. 468. The charge to the Commission was to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend
changes to the [Bankruptcy] Act... in order for such Act to reflect and adequately meet
the demands of present technical, financial, and commercial activities." Id. § l(b). See
H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (proposed bankruptcy statute). Section 7 of the
proposed statute is the relevant section dealing with corporate reorganization. See generally
Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditors or Stock-
holders?, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 540 (1973).
7. REPORT, supra note 6, at 256-58. Basically, the hierarchy of a firm's capital structure
ranges from "debt" downward to "equity." XV. CARY, CORPORATIONS 1177-78 (4th ed. 1969);
H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUCALL, supra note 1, at 98. Although there are numerous sub-
divisions of securities, the most important are: bonds (debts secured by liens on certain
properties); debentures (debts secured only by the general credit of the corporation);
preferred stock (equity with a prior right to dividends and to assets); and common stock
(equity with a residual claim to earnings and to assets). See id. at 83, 98-99, 112, 138-39.
That order also represents their ranking from more "senior" to more "junior" securities.
In this Note, the term "qualitative" refers to this hierarchy of securities in the firm's
capital structure. Common stock, therefore, may be said to be qualitatively inferior to
bonds. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-29 (1941).
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sion's analysis has itself encountered sharp criticism,8 but its work does
reflect dissatisfaction with the postulates and practices of Chapter X.
Important among the postulates is the "bonus rule," which requires
special additional compensation for any senior creditors of the de-
faulting firm who are paid off in securities of the reorganized firm
that are of lower rank in the capital structure than the senior credi-
tors' original securities.9 Recent criticism of the theoretical consistency
of the bonus rule, moreover, lends apparent support to the Commis-
sion's criticisms that senior security holders are overcompensated. 10
The bonus rule, consequently, is a natural target for reform pro-
posals designed to aid junior security interests.
This Note argues that the bonus rule is essential in practice and
is consistent with corporate reorganization theory. It contends as well
that courts could replace the somewhat unpredictable calculation of
the proper bonus that now prevails with a system promising greater
precision. They could do so by selectively incorporating the principles
of the investment value doctrine, the doctrine used in carrying out
the terms of Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935.11
I. Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganization under Chapter X
Chapter X is designed to be used when a "corporation is insolvent
or unable to pay its debts as they mature." 12 The consequence of such
a condition is the immediate maturing of the claims of the defaulted
senior security holders; according to the terms of the typical invest-
ment contract, it would be an appropriate time for foreclosure and,
probably, liquidation of the enterprise.1 3 A forced liquidation, how-
8. Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the Absolute
Priority Rule, 48 AMu. BANrR. L.J. 305 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney, Bankruptcy
Commission]. See Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority
Rule for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786 (1974).
9. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-29 (1941); p. 940
infra.
10. Blum, Corporate Reorganization Doctrine as Recently Applied by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 96, 110 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Blum,
Corporate Reorganization Doctrine].
11. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1970). See generally SEC v. Central-Illinois Sec. Corp., 338 U.S. 96,
131 (1949); 25 SEC ANN. REP. XXV-XXVI (1959) (foreword); Brudney, supra note 5.
12. Bankruptcy Act § 130(1), 11 U.S.C. § 530(1) (1970). Although framed in terms of
Chapter X, this Note is equally applicable to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 205 (1970), dealing with the reorganization of railroads, since the standards for the
valuation and payment of claims are used in Section 77 as in Chapter X. Section 77
diverges largely in the scope of authority given to the Interstate Commerce Commission
over the plan of reorganization.
13. The investment contract, in the case of bonds or debentures, is called the "in-
denture." It represents the agreement between the debtor corporation, the trustee of the
issuer, and the bondholders (or the debentureholders). H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL,
supra note 1, at 110-11.
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ever, would ignore the possibility that the firm, although insolvent,
may be worth more as a going-concern than it is as an aggregate of
salable assets. To avoid such an economically undesirable result, Chap-
ter X provides a mechanism for overriding the terms of the security
holders' investment contracts, to enable the corporation to be reor-
ganized when the going-concern value of the enterprise is greater
than its liquidation value.14
A. Valuation of Claims
The Chapter X process begins with the valuation of the claims
of the various security holders. Theoretically there are a number of
possible standards for measuring claims, such as liquidation rights or
investment values,1" but it has been clear since Case v. Los Angeles
Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970), the op-
portunity for the postponement of principal or interest past due dates is severely restricted:
The indenture to be qualified shall provide that, notwithstanding any other provision
thereof, the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the
principal of and interest on such indenture security, on or after the respective due
dates ... shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder, except
as to a postponement of an interest payment [for not more than three years, if
authorized by the holders of not less than 75 per centum in principal amount of the
outstanding indenture securities].
Id. §§ 77ppp(b).
14. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganizations, 17 U. CHi. L. REV.
565, 566 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Blum, Law and Language]: "One [of the main
principles that constitutes the framework for the current system of reorganization] is that
the assets of a distressed business are not to be disposed of until there has been a reason-
able opportunity to determine what disposition will be most advantageous. See, e.g., In re
Portland Elec. Power Co., 162 F.2d 618, 621-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947);
North American Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp., 143 F.2d 938,
940 (2d Cir. 1944); Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941); Blum & Kaplan, The
Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 651, 660
(1974); Ferber, Blasberg & Katz, Conflicts of Interest in Reorganization Proceedings Under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 326 (1959); Guthmann, Absolute Priority in Reorganizations:
Some Defects in a Supreme Court Doctrine, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 745 (1945).
15. The investment value doctrine was developed as the method of implementing
Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1970). See
SEC v. Central-Illinois Sec. Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 131 (1949); Brudney, supra note 5, at 646-
51. It calls for claims to be measured by their going-concern values rather than by the
formal requirements of the security holders' contracts or by some other norm. Brudney,
supra note 5, at 649; Electric Bond & Share Co., 30 S.E.C. 155, 170 (1949). Numerous sug-
gestions have been made that the investment value doctrine should be imported wholesale
into Chapter X, as a replacement for claims measurement on the basis of liquidation
rights. Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations: New
Directions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 553 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Billyou, New Directions];
Billyou, "New Directions": A Further Comment, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1379 (1954); Guthmann,
supra note 14; Comment, Allocation of Securities in Corporate Reorganizations: Claims
Measurement Through Investment Value Analysis, 61 YALE L.J. 656 (1952). These pro-
posals were based on the perception that the policies underlying Chapter X and Section
11, as reflected in many cases, were fundamentally similar. See e.g., Billyou, New Direc-
tions, supra, at 583-85; Comment, supra, at 683-85. Those suggestions met strong opposi-
tion. Blum, The "New Directions" for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1954); Brudney, supra note 5. The most cogent response argued that
the use of going-concern values (inevitably diminished in the situation of a company that
had failed) to measure the size of the claim would undermine the expectations of the
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Lumber Products Co.' that claims are to be measured by their liqui-
dation rights. 17 Case established, as well, what is now referred to as
the absolute priority rule:' 8 The Supreme Court, interpreting the
statutory requirement of a "fair and equitable" settlement of claims, 1
held that junior security holders are not entitled to participate un-
less and until the claims of the more senior security holders have
been satisfied in full. In other words, the classes are to participate to
the same extent they would have in an actual liquidation.
20
senior security holders, who, in taking senior securities, justifiably expected the risk of
economic distress to be visited first on the juniors. Brudney, supra note 5, at 664-65, 671;
Blum & Kaplan, supra note 14, at 663. The use of investment value analysis, moreover,
was thought to be inconsistent with the absolute priority rule in Chapter X, Blum, Full
Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorganization-A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 417, 426 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Blum, Full Priority]; Brudney, supra note 5, at
686-87, as well as with Chapter X's historical status as a substitute for liquidation. This
analysis has been accepted as determinative of the issue. See, e.g., Blum & Kaplan, supra
note 14, at 659; Note, supra note 8, at 1799 n.78. Thus the investment value doctrine has
lain dormant in the recent past.
16. 308 U.S. 106 (1939); cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
17. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); 10 SEC ANN. REP. 150
(1944); Blum, The "New Directions" for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
supra note 15, at 1371; BIlum, Full Priority, supra note 15, at 426.
"Liquidation rights" refers to the amount, specified in the security indenture, that a
security of a defined class shall receive upon the liquidation of the enterprise. As such, it
is distinct from the "going-concern right" of the security-the amount it is entitled to
get from a continuing corporation-and from the "going-concern value," that is, the market
price, Blum & Kaplan, supra note 14, at 659, of the security. See, e.g., Brudney, supra
note 5, at 668-69.
18. The "absolute priority rule" was first named in Bonbright & Bergerman, Two
Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Re6rganization, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928). See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-
19 (1939). It has since been applied consistently. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v:
DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1941); Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1942); SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594,
611 (1965); Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968); United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 327, 333 (1970);
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 473 & n.ll (1974); Rostow & Cutler,
Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganizations: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1347-50 (1939); Brudney, supra note 5, at 647.
19. Bankruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
20. The merits of the absolute priority rule have been extensively debated. See, e.g.,
Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 18; Guthmann, supra note 14 (early articles arguing
support for the so-called "relative priority rule"). For many of the more reflective materials,
see 2 J. BONmuc,Hr, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 864-70 (1937); 2 A. DEWING, supra note
2, at 1299-1304; cf. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YALE L.J. 923, 960
(1935). For a brief description of the difference between the absolute priority rule and its
most frequently discussed alternative, the relative priority rule, see 6A COLLIER ON BANK-
RuPrcv 11.06, at 623-25 (14th ed. 1972). See generally Polatsek, The Wreck of the Old
77, 34 CORN. L.Q. 532, 533 (1949).
Curiously, Justice Douglas, in Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974),
mentions that "[r]eorganization under § 77 aims at a continuation of the old business
under a new capital structure that respects the relative priorities of the various claimants."
Id. at 471 n.3 (emphasis added). The opinion is clear, however, that Justice Douglas did
not mean, by that phrase, to adopt a relative priority rule over the absolute priority
rule; indeed, he reaffirms the latter, see id. at 473 & n.11.
A fairly broad consensus, supporting the reasoning in Case and justifying the absolute
priority rule, has emerged. See, e.g., Blum, Full Priority, supra note 15, at 419; Friendly,
Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 39, 77 (1934);
Friendly & Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations
Under Section 77, 7 LAw & CONTMP. PROB. 420, 422-25 (1940); Note, Absolute Priority
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B. Payment of Claims
Although the practice of valuing claims by the absolute priority
rule is well established, the valuation of claims is only the first of
a court's tasks in reorganization. Claims not only must be measured,
they also must be "paid." 2' 1 Payment involves uncertainty when ap-
plied to an enterprise that is to be continued rather than liquidated,
since the claims are to be paid not with cash or with assets but with
the reorganized firm's securities, the value of which will depend on
the value of the reorganized company as a going-concern. 22 The court
must determine this going-concern value. An obvious source for the
figure is the "market value" of the company-that is, the value of
the company as computed from the prices that the company's cur-
rently outstanding securities command in the securities markets. In-
stead of market value, however, courts use a judge-made figure which
is termed tlhe enterprise's "reorganization value."2 3 This has come to
mean a valuation based on the capitalization, at an appropriate rate,
of prospective earnings.2 4 This valuation, as well as its component
Under Chapter X-A Rule of Law or a Familiar Quotation?, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 902-
03 (1952). See generally, Brudney, supra note 5, at 677-82; Gerdes, Supreme Court Ruling
on Reorganization, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 9, 1941, § 2, at 11, col. 3, reprinted in E.
DODD & D. BILLYOU, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 72-73 (1950).
The consensus builds on a recognition that the reasons for preferring reorganization to
liquidation do not provide a justification for the substitution of another rule and the
concomitant visitation of the impact of the reorganization on those who, contractually,
have priority in a situation where default has occurred. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 677,
681; V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIEIrSrEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 120 n.p (1972).
Even the Bankruptcy Commission ostensibly subscribes to the consensus in favor of the
absolute priority rule. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 258; Rochelle & Balzersen, Recom-
mendations for Amendments to Chapter X, 46 Am. BANKR. L.J. 93, 99 (1972) (Rochelle
was a member of the Bankruptcy Commission). See generally Brudney, Bankruptcy Coni-
nission, supra note 8, at 307-08. But many, with justification, have charged that the
Commission's proposals would in fact vitiate the rule. Id. at 320-23, 332-33, 340; Blum &
Kaplan, supra note 14, at 672-73. Note, supra note 8, at 1811-16.
21. Billyou, New Directions, supra note 15, at 566-68; cf. T. FINL-rER, THE LAw OF
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 438-39 (1939). The absolute priority rule is of lesser aid in
defining what is full payment, for it is a standard which speaks most directly to the
phenomenon of measurement, stated in a sum certain, and not to the problem of determin-
ing what will constitute appropriate payment. See, e.g., Friendly & Tondel, supra note 20,
at 423.
22. 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11.05, at 594-95 (14th ed. 1972). See, e.g., Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913); P.R. Walsh Tie & Timber Co. v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., 280 F. 38, 44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 743 (1922); In re General Stores Corp.,
150 F.Supp. 868, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd on other grounds sub nora. Ruskin v. Griffiths,
250 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1958); Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations
Act, supra note 20, at 77.
23. Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 565; Note, supra note 20, at 904:
The importance of the valuation figure cannot be overstressed, as it determines the
size of the pie to be cut up among the various classes of old security holders. It thus
determines whether and to what extent junior security holders share in the new
company.
24. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26:
Findings as to the earning capacity of an enterprise are essential to a determination
of the feasibility as well as the fairness of a plan of reorganization.... It is also es-
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parts, is the ultimate responsibility of the reorganization judge, who
makes his decision based on suggestions and information from the
SEC, the corporation, and the creditors.2 5 Reorganization value is
thus a theoretical construct. It may perhaps coincide with the market
determination of value, but the one is not determined by nor de-
pendent on the other. This rejection of the market 26 appears in the
valuation not only of the aggregate enterprise, but also of the com-
ponent securities that will aggregate to the enterprise value; 27 the
court recognizes only the "face value" 28 of the individual securities
to be used in payment.
sential for satisfaction of the absolute priority rule of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co....
It is plain that valuations for other purposes are not relevant to or helpful in a
determination of that issue, except as they may indirectly bear on earning capacity.
*.. The criterion of earning capacity is the essential one....
See, e.g., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St.P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523,
540-41 (1943); Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441-42 (1968); Moulded Products, Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220, 225
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d
522, 525 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Associated Gas &- Elec. Co., 149 F.2d 996, 1109 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945); In re Spectrum Arena, Inc., 340 F.Supp. 767, 778 (E.D.Pa.
1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 156 (3d Cir.J972); In re Alabama, Tenn. & N.R.R. Corp., 47 F. Supp.
694, 707-08 (S.D. Ala. 1942); SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK,
ACTIvrrIEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITrEEs, pt.
8, at 156 (1940).
25. See, e.g., In re Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F.Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 6A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11.05, at 590-93 (14th ed. 1972); Blum, Law and Language, supra
note 14, at 572-75, 577-78; King, Chapter X Valuation: Principles on Application, 42
REF. J. 108, 109-10 (1968); Note, supra note 20, at 904-05, 907; Note, Bankruptcy: Corporate
Reorganization: Survey of Chapter X in Operation, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 399, 464 (1941).
For an examination of the selection of different valuations, compare La France Indus., 5
S.E.C. 917, 936 (1939), with In re La France Indus., CCH BANKR. L. REP. 52,339 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 8, 1939); compare Flour Mills of America, 7 S.E.C. 1 (1940), with Flour Mills of
America, 7 S.E.C. 30 (1940); compare Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941), with In re
Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F.Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1941).
26. Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 571-72; Blum, Full Priority, supra
note 15, at 419-20; cf. Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 317, 340-43 (1941); Gardner, The S.E.C. and Valuation Under Chapter X,
91 U. PA. L. REv. 440, 456-57 (1943). Although it is sometimes asserted that the court is
concerned with the long-term value of the security, it is hard to imagine that the market
is not also concerned with long-term value. See W. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 88-93
(1969); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 421-22: "The [dividend capitaliza-
tion model of share valuation] assumes that the present value of a share of stock is equal
to the value of all future dividend payments, capitalized at a rate reflecting the market's
view of the risks associated with the firm's expected income stream." Cf. Brudney, supra
note 5, at 660.
27. Apart from the question of leverage it is definitionally true that the aggregate
value of the securities outstanding should equal the enterprise value. On the question of
leverage, see B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 539-50 (4th ed. 1962).
The concept of leverage-at least apart from the external tax effect-has come under
cogent attack. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (the classic statement of the
proposition that leverage is irrelevant). See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 20, at 381-98; J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 212-13 (1971).
28. See Friendly & Tondel, supra note 20, at 424; cf. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-29 (1941); Missouri Pacific R.R., 290 I.C.C. 477, 555 (1954), plan
approved, 129 F.Supp. 392 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 225 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 959 (1956); Frank, supra note 26, at 340. Face value is usually the same as the liqui-
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It has been asserted that the court's rejection of market value stems
from a perception that the market is-at least temporarily-unreliable
in valuing a company that has failed.29 Professor Blum suggests, how-
ever, that such a rationale, while helpful in understanding the exist-
ing system of corporate reorganization, was not decisive in molding
the system. "The prevailing pressure," he contends, "was to relieve
junior corporate investors from their senior contracts which had turned
out disastrously for them."30 This implied relief function for junior
security holders is in fact generally fulfilled: The Chapter X courts
consistently establish reorganization values that exceed market values,
sometimes by a substantial margin.31 Because the market is not deter-
minative in the process, reorganizations pursuant to Chapter X permit
a deviation from the cash equivalence concept of the absolute priority
rule: A serior security holder ends up with pieces of paper which
cannot be exchanged on the market for the cash amount of his original,
dation value of the security: if a bond has a face value of $1,000, it will be entitled to
$1,000 on liquidation.
Professor Blum writes: "Reorganization value is what some appraisers believe the current
market value of the distressed company ought to be if the present were like the future
they foresee. It is thus a liberalization of market price corresponding with some expert
opinion about the inherent value of the enterprise." Blum, Law and Language, supra
note 14, at 578. See, e.g., id. at 572, 579-581.
29. Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 567-68. A corollary to this position
must be that the court assumes it is able to approximate the "true" going-concern value
of a security more accurately than the market is able to. A considerable body of literature,
however, casts doubt on the ability of a nonmarket agency-be it an investor, an in-
vestment adviser, or a court-to "out guess" the market. See V. BRUDNEY & f. CnIRELSTEIN,
supra note 20, at 1108-23; B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL SmEEr (1973); SEC,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., supp. vol. I,
at 227-30 (1971); Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604,
1614-17 (1971); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 1966 J. Bus. 119; Bishop, Book
Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1100, 1108-09 (1974).
30. Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 569. Whether utilization of the market
for the valuation of an enterprise in Chapter X was rejected because of a perception that
a pessimistic market is especially unreliable in valuing corporations in default or whether
it was rejected because of a desire to relieve junior corporate investors from some of the
burden of bankruptcy reorganization, the implication must be that the market value
will be lower than the reorganization value during the period of, and immediately after,
the reorganization. See Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorgan-
ization-A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 444 (1958):
To those who are primarily concerned with the plight of junior interests in finan-
cially distressed companies ... an "expansible valuation" or "maximum permissible
capitalization" approach will seem best.
"Jacking up value is an obvious device for circumventing the absolute priority rule."
Gardner, supra note 26, at 456-57.
31. This is true especially in railroad reorganization cases under Section 77, but ap-
parently is true in Chapter X cases as well. Note, Valuation by the SEC in Reorganization,
55 HARv. L. REV. 125, 132-34 (1941); Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14; Brudney,
supra note 5, at 679; Friendly 9- Tondel, supra note 20. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946), and its aftermath in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 302 N.Y. 658, 98 N.E.2d 474, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951). For a
good analysis of the actual monetary outcomes from the process of satisfaction in re-
organization value equivalents, see Billyou, supra note 15, at 570-71 & n.61; cf. Florida
East Coast Ry., 282 I.C.C. 81, 115, 158-59 (1951) (the ICC compares the probable market
values of the securities with their reorganization values).
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liquidation-based rights.32 Nevertheless, since the proponents of this
approach assert that market value is expected eventually to equal the
reorganization value, they are able to conclude that the absolute prior-
ity rule enjoys strict adherence. 33
II. The Role of the Bonus Rule in Chapter X
Were the senior security holders always to have their claims satis-
fied by the receipt of securities qualitatively identical to those they
possessed in the enterprise prior to the reorganization (i.e., bonds for
bonds, common stock for common stock), the process would be at an
end. The old senior security holders would be deemed paid in full
if the court-assigned face value of the new but qualitatively identi-
cal securities were quantitatively identical to their liquidation-based
claims. 3
4
The usual process of reorganization, however, involves a qualita-
tive shifting of securities, for example, exchanging bonds of the old
corporation for common or preferred stock of the reorganized cor-
poration. 35 The reason for such a shift is typically to reduce the en-
32. Once a hierarchy of interests is established, each class must receive 100% satis-
faction before the next lower class may participate at all.... However-and this is a
vitally important corollary-100% satisfaction is deemed to be given by 100% satisfac-
tion in paper. Priorities are considered satisfied if the full amount of the claim is
recognized in securities of the appropriate dollar amount. No attempt has been made
to insist that the securities issuable to a senior class must have a prospective market
1'alue of 100 cents on the dollar before a junior class may participate.
Friendly & Tondel, supra note 20, at 423. At least one early reading of Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941), reached the conclusion that the case required
payment in market value equivalents. See Dean, A Review of,the Law of Corporate Re-
organization, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 537, 559 n.63 (1941). It quickly became clear, however, that
market equivalence was not required. See sources cited in note 31 supra; Blum, Law and
Language, supra note 14, at 571.
It has been argued that "full satisfaction" has been achieved if the surrendering senior
security holders "receive, for their total claim, a par amount of new securities having a
reasonable prospect of selling for the amount of the claims for which they were ex-
changed," even though not immediately equal to that amount in cash. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 290 I.C.C. 477, 555 (1954), plan approved sub nom. In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 129 F.
Supp. 392 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd sub. nom. Missouri Pac. R.R. 51% Sec. Serial Bondholders
Comm. v. Thompson, 225 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 959 (1956). See
generally Brudney, supra note 5, at 672; cf. Frank, supra note 26, at 340. Even this process
of "waiting" for full compensation may not be fair to the senior security-holders. See, e.g.,
V. BRUDNRY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33; cf. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399
U.S. 392, 485-87 (1970).
33. Jerome Frank, while Chairman of the SEC, wrote:
We believe that senior security holders are entitled to receive more than mere paper
securities of a face amount equal to their claims; and that the securities they receive
should be such as to give them really compensatory treatment for their claims. In
other words, the new securities should be intrinsically sound, so that there is a
reasonable prospect that they will have values equal to their face amount ....
Frank, supra note 26, at 340.
34. Friendly & Tondel, supra note 20, at 424; Billyou, supra note 15, at 570-72 n.61.
35. See, e.g., Frye, The "Fair and Equitable" Doctrine: Are Liquidation Rights a
Realistic Standard During Corporate Reorganizations?, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 394, 400-01
(1971).
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terprise's fixed interest charges, themselves often a precipitating cause
of the bankruptcy reorganization, or to simplify the security struc-
ture.36 The result is that senior security holders are often paid in se-
curities of a lower qualitative ranking than those they previously
possessed.37
In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois,38 the Supreme Court
confronted this shifting of relative priorities.30 Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for a unanimous court, perceived that such a qualitative shifting
might be used to evade the absolute priority rule. Consequently, he
announced in his holding what has become known as the bonus rule:
Thus it is plain that while creditors may be given inferior grades
of securities, their "superior rights" must be recognized. Clearly,
those prior rights are not recognized, in cases where stockholders
are participating in the plan, if creditors are given only a face
amount of inferior securities equal to the face amount of their
claims. They must receive, in addition, compensation for the
senior rights which they are to surrender. If they receive less than
that full compensatory treatment, some of their property rights
will be appropriated for the benefit of stockholders without com-
pensation. That is not permissible.40
The rule has become a principal element of Chapter X proceedings.
41
36. Note, Distribution of Securities in Corporate Reorganization, 51 YALE L.J. 85, 96-97
(1941).
37. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 528 (1941); In re Barium
Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81, 87 (E.D. Mich. 1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 562 (4th Cir.), modified,
157 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1946); Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 583; Calkins,
Feasibility in Plans of Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter X, 61 HARv. L. REv. 763,
763 (1948); Comment, supra note 15, at 660; Note, supra note 20, at 903 n.22.
38. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
39. Justice Douglas acknowledged that the process of reorganization did not prohibit
per se the satisfaction of claims with qualitatively different securities:
The absolute priority rule does not mean that bondholders cannot be given inferior
grades of securities, or even securities of the same grade as are received by junior
interests. Requirements of feasibility of reorganization plans frequently necessitate it
in the interests of simpler and more conservative capital structures. And standards
of fairness permit it.
Id. at 528.
40. Id. at 528-29. The SEC apparently had arrived at a similar formulation of the
bonus rule shortly before Justice Douglas's pronouncement. See Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7
S.E.C. 174 (1940). The SEC there thought that a bonus called for in the plan, approxi-
mately 10 percent over the amount of the claim, was appropriate "even accepting the
appraised value" on which the reorganization process had been premised. Id. at 194. A
lower court decision in that case, handed down two months prior to Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941), also applied a bonus rule, noting that "[tihe
noteholders are entitled to compensation for the loss of priority." Standard Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615, 616-17 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564
(1941); cf. T. FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 410 (1937) (seeing the
necessity for a "quid pro quo"); T. FINLETrER, supra note 21, at 442.
41. See, e.g., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. &. Pac. R.R., 318
U.S. 523, 557-66 (1943); Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 888-89 (4th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951); cf. Yale Express Systems, Inc., SEC Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 309, at 24 (Jan. 14, 1972). Blum writes that the language of Justice
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Justice Douglas' bonus rule, however, contains an apparent anomaly.
If only reorganization values are to be used in Chapter X proceed-
ings (and the policy clearly establishes this), then the face value of
the new securities which will be given out to represent that reor-
ganization value must, for the purposes of the reorganization process,
be assumed correct, since the reorganization value of the enterprise
assigned by the court is assumed correct, and the sum of the face
values must aggregate to that reorganization value.42 Thus the* face
value of a new security certificate must equal, insofar as the court
administering Chapter X is concerned, "actual" value. Hence, if old
senior security holders are compensated with new junior securities (or,
indeed, vice versa), quantitatively neither a bonus nor a penalty would
be required to balance the change in qualitative status. To apply a
bonus or a penalty, that is to suggest, would be analogous to falling
into the error of assuming that a ton of feathers indeed weighed less
than a ton of lead.
The bonus rule, as a result, -has been criticized4 3 for being inherently
in conflict with the courts' refusal to use the market in valuing the
enterprise. If indeed the Chapter X process recognized only face values,
the bonus rule would be unjustifiable. Once the theoretical structure
of the current system of reorganization is properly understood, how-
ever, the bonus rule is compatible not only with the practice of bank-
ruptcy reorganization, but also with the theory behind Chapter X.
A. Justifying the Bonus Rule in Practice
As a practical matter, it is apparent that there usually will be a di-
vergence between the face and the market value even of a qualitative-
ly identical new security in the reorganized enterprise. The old seniors
Douglas "has become the touchstone of the full compensation doctrine." Blum, Corporate
Reorganization Doctrine, supra note 10, at 107.
The logic of Justice Douglas's bonus rule seemed compelling, with the result that
commentators quickly accepted the bonus rule as a logical extension of the absolute
priority rule. Frank, supra note 26, at 346; Gardner, supra note 26, at 460; Comment,
supra note 15, at 660.
42. See note 27 supra.
43. This contradiction was recently explained by Professor Blum:
If that valuation [placed on the entire enterprise] is approved, then, logically, the
value attributed to the new common stock-computed by deducting the principal or
par amount of all higher ranking securities from the total enterprise value-must also
be accepted as correct. Doubt about the value of the common necessarily translates
into doubt about the valuation of the firm itself. The very acknowledgement of need
for a quantitative "bonus" to creditors receiving the common is an admission that
the firm has been overvalued.
Blum, Corporate Reorganization Doctrine, supra note 10, at 110 (emphasis added) (con-
cludes that "[a]n oblique modification of that valuation by way of a 'bonus'... should
not be condoned").
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suffer an additional loss, however, if their claims are satisfied with
qualitatively different securities, at least where they are lumped to-
gether with those who formerly held an inferior security.44 Because
of the different risk characteristics inherent in the various securities,
the impact of the gap between market and reorganization value, equiv-
alent to a one-shot decline in enterprise value,45 will not fall propor-
tionately over the spectrum of the capital structure. Rather, it will fall
more heavily on the junior securities4" because the more junior end
of a capital structure encompasses securities that have assumed a pro-
portionately greater risk of such a decline. 47 Thus, when the old senior
security holders are paid with new junior securities rather than with
new senior securities an additional portion of the enterprise value.
shifts to those holders of new junior securities who held only junior
securities in the old firm. 48 Viewed in this manner, it is apparent that
44. It is necessary to stress that the bonus rule should be applicable only when there
may be said to be a comparative shift in quality between old senior and junior security
holders. This may be seen most persuasively, perhaps, in a situation where the old senior
security holders were holders of 5 percent income debentures whereas the only junior
security holders remaining after valuation were participating preferred. There would
seem to be no reason for the application of the bonus rule if the debenture holders
were satisfied with preferred, and the old preferred satisfied with common. The old
seniors still will have a first entitlement on the same proportion of the enterprise's in-
come stream as if they had been given a comparable new security. The bonus rule would
be called into play, in this example, only if both classes were to be compensated out of
the same security class. As long as the old seniors maintain priority (and their interest
rate does not change), the bonus rule should not be necessary. The phrase "qualitatively
inferior security" is used to represent this constellation of considerations.
45. See, e.g., Blum, Full Priority, supra note 15, at 437. That is, a one-shot decline
occurs when the differential between reorganization and market values is finally recog-
nized.
46. This may be seen by pursuing the analogy of a one-shot decline. A sudden loss will
hit the value of the common harder, because the troubled corporation will decrease or
eliminate dividends long before it will tamper with the bondholders' fixed interest rights.
47. See generally H. GuTHMANN 9- H. DOUGALL, supra note 1, at 67-123.' It is commonly
recognized in security analysis that the price placed on a security by the individuals in
the market is a function not only of the security's expected return, but also of the degree
of risk associated with that expected return. See V. BRun-NEY & M. CHIREESTEIN, supra note
20, at 56, 1109.
48. This may be demonstrated by example. Corporation R is in reorganization under
Chapter X, and the reorganization court has declared a reorganization value of $150,000.
Corporation R has two classes of securities: bonds, with a liquidation claim of $100,000,
and common, with a claim to the residue. The market, however, is not so sanguine about
the future, and foresees the following probability distribution of expected enterprise
values:








If the court retains the security structure of the reorganized enterprise-thereby giving
the bondholders qualitatively equivalent securities-the absolute priority rule would be
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the bonus rule is a necessary tool to ensure that the degree of sacrifice
imposed upon senior security holders due to a discrepancy between
the reorganization and the market value of the enterprise does not
depend on the fortuity of the type of security they are to receive in
the reorganized enterprise.
B. Justifying the Bonus Rule in Theory
The foregoing demonstrates that the bonus rule's practical justifi-
cation depends on the recognition of a discrepancy between the re-
organization and the market values of the enterprise. But traditional
corporate reorganization theory rejects the relevance of market valua-
tion. In order to justify the presence of the bonus rule in the theory
of Chapter X, it is necessary to justify the recognition, at some point,
of a discrepancy between market and reorganization value. Further,
the justification needs to be developed without overthrowing the
courts' consistent refusal to recognize such a discrepancy during the
deemed satisfied. The market's calculation of the bondholders' expected return and as-
sociated risk appears as follows:









The bondholders, given qualitatively equivalent bonds, would therefore find that they
had an expected value of return of $91,000. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRsrEIN, supra note
20, at 49.66.
If the court decides instead to use an all common security structure, then to give the
bondholders only the face amount of their claim would leave them worse off. Since their
claim is $100,000, they would receive, if there were no bonus rule, $100,000 of face-value
common, or two-thirds of the total amount of common:









The bondholders, here compensated with $100,000 of reorganization value common,
would find they now had an expected value of return of $66,667 and with a greater
downside potential than before. Clearly, therefore, a discrepancy between reorganization
and market values creates a discrepancy in the quantity of actual payment made that will
depend on the quality of the securities received. See note 47 supra.
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valuation process itself, since that refusal is essential to the claim that
the absolute priority rule enjoys strict adherence. 49
This theoretical justification may be provided by viewing the Chap-
ter X procedure as a process encompassing two discrete stages. Under
this view, at the first stage the courts are concerned with the surrogate
liquidation process: They are interested in valuing the rights of the
various classes of security holders that would have existed upon a liqui-
dation. At this stage the courts are not yet concerned with the via-
bility of the enterprise as a going-concern. What is determined at this
stage are the claims and the total value of the enterprise from which
those claims are to be satisfied.50 The first stage, therefore, only in-
volves a process of determining how large the enterprise value is, in
order to determine which groups of security holders will be permitted
to retain an interest in that corporation. It is not yet necessary to
determine the viability of the corporation's security structure.
More precisely, this first stage is dominated by the Chapter X re-
quirement that reorganizations be "fair and equitable",;-the require-
ment of absolute priority. At this stage, as the courts have indicated,
the market value is irrelevant.52 Questions of whether operations after
reorganization are feasible are also irrelevant at this first stage. The
court is concerned with meeting a liquidation-based absolute priority
rule in measuring and paying claims, and not with the feasibility of
a going-concern.
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the capital structure of the
reorganized company at this stage as unchanged from the pre-reor-
ganization capital structure.58 Once it has been determined by this
process which groups of security holders are entitled to participate in
the reorganized company, then those security holders may be con-
sidered to be given, in satisfaction of their claims, the new, but quali-
tatively identical, securities. Payment in qualitatively equivalent securi-
ties is not required in Chapter X reorganization, 4 but it always re-
mains an alternative. If qualitatively identical securities are given out
upon reorganization, then under the current system the absolute prior-
49. See pp,,938-39 supra.
50. See pp.f9 S4 -3 6 supra; Blum & Kaplan, supra note 14, at 655.
51. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970).
52. See pp. 936-39 supra.
53. This capital structure equivalence would continue, of course, only as long as the
reorganization value of the enterprise is great enough to permit further classes of junior
security-holders to participate.
54. Nor could qualitative equivalence be required, in a general system of reorganiza-
tion which had as a goal the financially stable continuation of economically viable enter-
prises. Reorganization typically scales down fixed interest charges. See 2 A. DEWING, supra
note 2, at 1246-97, 1436-39.
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ity rule is deemed fulfilled as long as the face amount of the new, quali-
tatively identical, securities equals the total of the security holder's
claim. In such a case, the bonus rule does not apply; the security holders
are considered satisfied in full, no matter what is the size of the argu-
able gap between face value and market value of the securities they now
own. Payment in qualitative equivalents, therefore, may be taken as the
standard of satisfaction against which a different form of satisfaction-
such as "inferior" securities-is to be measured. That is, for any other
form of payment equally to satisfy the absolute priority rule, each class
of security holders must be in no worse a position under such .alterna-
tive payment than it would have been under the qualitative equiva-
lence exchange.
Once the qualitatively equivalent securities have been "given" in
satisfaction of the claims, the first stage may be considered complete
and a second stage begins. It is a recapitalization, focusing on the en-
terprise as a going-concern and dominated by the statutory require-
ment that the plan be "feasible."' 55 Creating a feasible capital structure
usually requires a qualitaiive shifting of securities. But the fair and
equitable standard does not evaporate in this stage; it still forbids a
shift in value from the old senior to the old junior security holders.
Since this second stage of the reorganization process may be viewed
as a discrete step, it is not contradictory to suggest that market or
going-concern values may be the relevant criteria here, although they
were not relevant in Stage One. The bonus rule, as a consequence,
naturally enters this second stage, because the old senior security
holders should be compensated quantitatively for the loss of priority
they sustain when they are asked to accept qualitatively junior se-
curities solely in order to make the reorganization plan "feasible."
Whether viewing the process of reorganization in terms of a two-
stage process is reasonable under the present practices of Chapter X
depends on whether it is logical to view "feasible" as a standard suf-
ficiently separate from "fair and equitable" to justify treating the
two standards as keystones of successive stages. Bonbright and Ber-
german, writing in 1928, before the Bankruptcy Act codified the lan-
guage, suggested that the two standards were sufficiently separate:
Fairness is the aspect that is concerned with the equitable divi-
sion of the new securities among the various parties at interest.
It is concerned only incidentally with the effectiveness of the
55. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970). See SEC, ADVISORY REPORT IN RE
YUBA CONSOL. INDUS., INC. 28-29 (1965), quoted in In re Yuba Consol. Indus. Inc., 242 F.
Supp. 561, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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reorganization plan in restoring the property to financial and eco-
nomic well-being. This latter consideration, to be sure, is much
the more socially important of the two; so important, indeed,
that it quite properly conditions the whole thing as to a fair dis-
tribution of the new securities among the old security holders.
But, for purposes of analysis the two problems can, to some ex-
tent, be treated separately.56
The term "fair and equitable" in Chapter X spawned the absolute
priority rule,57 which was developed to deal with the question of the
precedence to be accorded senior creditors over equity and junior
creditor interests upon the occurence of the financial event that con-
fronted the firm with the choice of liquidation, equity receivership,
or reorganization. 58 Feasibility, on the other hand, entails significantly
different perspectives. 59 It is not a standard based upon liquidation.
Instead, it is forward-looking, concentrating on the going-concern suc-
cess of the enterprise emerging from reorganization, not on the liqui-
dation rights of the security holders.60
56. Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 18, at 128. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 677.
57. See note 18 supra; 18 SEC ANN. REp. 156 (1952).
58. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-17 (1939).
59. 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 11.04, at 586-87; 11.07, at 637-38 (14th ed. 1972).
60. 6 SEC ANN. REP. 65 (1940); 16 SEC ANN. REP. 128 (1950); S. REP. No. 1916, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 36 (1938); SEC, supra note 24, at 159. Professor Blum was thinking in these
conceptual terms when he wrote:
This formula [i.e., of a "fair plan"] assumes that the seniors receive new paper
thought to be equivalent in quality, as well as in normal quantity, to their old hold-
ings. In most situations that arrangement would undermine the rehabilitation opera-
tion by preserving fixed charges that are heavy in relation to estimated earnings. The
statutory requirement that a plan be feasible as well as fair usually necessitates a
more or less drastic scaling down of such obligations and this ordinarily can be ac-
complished only by reducing the quality of paper allocated to the seniors.
Blum, Law and Language, supra note 14, at 58. See Calkins, supra note 37, at 763; Note,
supra note 25,.at 466; Note, supra note 56, at 91-92. Feasibility, therefore, is conceptually
distinct from the Chapter X fair and equitable standard: its concern is with the future
life of the company, not with a substitute for an otherwise ensuing death.
The courts have consistently recognized that the standard embodied in "feasible" is a
distinct standard from that embodied in "fair and equitable" and calls, consequently, for
a different focus, and different concerns. See General Stores v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462,
467-68 (1956); In re Waern Bldg. Corp., 145 F.2d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 871 (1945); New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. Co., 143 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir.
1944); Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 91 F.2d 827, 830 (4th Cir. 1937);
In re Spectrum Arena, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 767, 780 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Barium Realty
Co., 62 F. Supp. 81, 87 (E.D. Mich. 1945); In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 129,
130 (E.D. Pa. 1943). The SEC has consistently applied the "fair and equitable" standard
distinctly from the "feasible" standard, much as the courts have. 5 SEC ANN. REP. 14-16
(1939). See, e.g., International Ry. Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 76, at 18-33 (June
30, 1949); Childs Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 67, at 32-48 (Sept. 30, 1946); Cenwest
Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 59, at 7-9 (Feb. 1, 1944); Hudson & Manhattan Ry.
Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 110, at 34-42 (Dec. 2, 1958); Four Seasons Nursing
Centers of America, Inc., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 310, at 40-57 (Mar. 16, 1972).
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III. Implementing the Bonus Rule: The Investment Value Doctrine
In implementing the bonus rule, courts have been unable to formu-
late a uniform and precise method of measuring the bonus; in Chapter
X opinions, bonuses just appear, like pansies in the spring.0 1 However,
there is precedent under a similar statute, the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935, 62 that can improve the courts' bonus calcula-
tions. Section 11 of that Act made statutory reorganization mandatory
on non-defaulting-indeed, often very successful-enterprises in order
to simplify the inordinately complex structures that characterized the
public utility industry. 3 In Section 11, the SEC and the courts re-
jected the use of contractual liquidation rights to measure claims, on
the ground that Congress's mandate to simplify was a mandate to re-
structure the capital system of the enterprise, but without shifting
values within a going-concern. 64 "Feasibility" is the analogous statu-
tory mandate of the second stage of Chapter X, calling for reform of
the capital structure of the enterprise so as to ensure its success as a
going-concern. Consequently, the analysis undertaken for Section 11
is appropriate here: It should be assumed that Congress did not in-
tend to shift values at this point in Chapter X proceedings-to do
so would be to undermine the prior operation of the absolute prior-
ity rule-merely because of a recapitalization of the security structure
pursuant to the statutory mandate of feasibility.
The bonus rule was designed to ensure that such a shift does not
occur.65 It is appropriate, therefore, to give content to the bonus rule
61. Cf. Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 888 (4th Cir. 1950);
Standard Gas & Elec. Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F2d 615, 616-17 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941); In re Midland United Co., 58 F. Supp. 667, 684-85 (D. Del.),
appeal dismissed, 141 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1944), later proceeding, 64 F. Supp. 399 (D. Del.
1946), af'd, 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947); In re Alabama, Tenn. & N. R.R., 47 F. Supp. 694,
708-09 (S.D. Ala. 1942).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1970).
63. 25 SEC ANN. REP. XXV-XXVI (1959) (foreword).
64. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 638 (1945):
Congress did not intend that its exercise of power to simplify should mature rights,
created without regard to the possibility of simplification of system structure, which
otherwise would only arise by voluntary action of stockholders or, involuntarily,
through action of creditors. We must assume that Congress intended to exercise its
power with the least possible harm to citizens.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 79k(a) (1970); SEC v. Central-Illinois SEC Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 131,
140 (1949); Lahti v. New Eng. Power Ass'n, 160 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1947) (Magruder, J.);
In re The United Corp., 128 F. Supp. 725, 727, 731, 738 (D. Del. 1955); S. REP. No. 621,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 56, 59 (1935); cf. id. at 2 (Report by President F. Roosevelt to
Congress).
65. The second stage is the stage concerned with the functioning of the bonus rule,
and the bonus rule means, in practice, that the going-concern value of what is received
must equal the going-concern value of what would have been received had the claims been
satisfied with qualitatively equivalent securities. The "bonus" arises because such a
going-concern equivalence is achieved only when the face value of the qualitatively in-
ferior payment is greater than the amount of the liquidation-based claim to be sur-
rendered.
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by adopting its counterpart under Section 11, the investment value
doctrine. That doctrine demands that each class of security holders
receive securities in the reorganized enterprise equivalent to the value
of their investments in the old enterprise (not the value of their liqui-
dation rights). Investment value, it should be stressed, does not enter
into the first stage of Chapter X; it plays no role in deciding who
will participate in the reorganized enterprise, and so it does not un-
dermine the absolute priority rule.00 Instead the doctrine enters only
at the second stage. Using the first stage as a base, it merely aids in
the decision as to how the various classes are to participate.
A series of related examples, illustrated in Table I, demonstrates
the equivalence between the bonus rule and the investment value doc-
trine and shows how Section 11 principles will be used only in the
second stage of the Chapter X process.
Assume first a company involved in a Section 11 proceeding. Prior
to this proceeding, the company has bonds with a market or going-
66. The scheme suggested here therefore is not subject to the criticisms summarized in
note 15 supra. Professor Brudney's objection, that the going-concern value would
measure the claim in terms of the going-concern value of an enterprise that has failed, is
likewise not applicable here. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 671. For, instead of measuring
the claim to be satisfied per se, the investment value doctrine, utilized at this second
stage, compares the going-concern values of different securities within the corporation. If
the going-concern value of a senior security is depressed, nonetheless it is being used as
the standard against which the going-concern value of a junior security, which will, by
hypothesis, be even more depressed, is being measured.
The debate in the 1950's between the proponents and opponents of applying the in-
vestment value doctrine in Chapter X, see note 15 supra, apparently focused only on the
claims side of the claims-payment equation, perhaps as a result of the fact that the in-
vestment value doctrine in Section 11 was primarily discussed in terms of the measure-
ment of claims; cf. note 15 supra. On that ground, the opponents of the doctrine were
undoubtedly correct; if the process of measuring payment remained the same, to change
the method of valuing claims would upset the equation. The policy of Section 11 that
investment values should not be shifted demands, of course, that going-concern values,
and not face values, be used for measuring payment as well as for measuring claims. See
Brudney, supra note 5, at 662; cf. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1945). Only in
that manner could it be asserted that going-concern values have not shifted; that assertion
could not be made, for example, if going-concern values were used to measure claims
while face values were used to measure payment. And, in cases arising under Section 11,
payment was indeed measured in the identical terms in which claims were measured. See,
e.g., Eastern Gas 9. Fuel Associates, 30 S.E.C. 834, 909-16, 919 (1950).
It follows that the investment value doctrine, if used on both the claims and payment
side of the equation, would lead to a result similar to that reached under the current
Chapter X system. In Table I, infra, for example, compare Charts 2; 3 with Charts 6, 9.
That this is so may be seen by remembering that the current Chapter X process, by the
inflating of payment values, accompanied by the use of face values to measure payment,
means that senior security-holders are not, in reality, paid 100 cents on the dollar, see
pp. 938-39 & note 32 supra. Thus Chapter X as it presently exists already undermines
the expectations of the senior security-holders: it already hurts the seniors. The invest-
ment value analysis, using a deflated standard-that of going-concern values-on both sides
of the equation would not cause significant further harm to the seniors.
For the purposes of this Note, however, it is not crucial to discover whether the
proponents and opponents of the investment value analysis focused, perhaps incorrectly,
only on the claims side of the claims-payment equation. It has by now been firmly
established that corporate reorganization law demands the use ab initio of liquidation
rights to measure claims. See pp. 934-35 supra. For that reason, the investment value
doctrine is inappropriate, at least in the first stage where claims are measured.
948

































































concern value of $95,000, and common stock with a market value
of $15,000.7 The face value of the bonds is $100,000, although this
figure is not itself relevant to the Section 11 proceeding. The market
value of the company, computed by adding together the market values
of the component securities, is $110,000. A court holds, under Section
11, that the corporation must reform its capital structure so that the
company has $52,000 face value of bonds and $55,000 face value of
preferred stock. Let us say that the market values after restructuring
are $50,000, for each of these two classes, and $10,000 for the common.68
67. See Table I, Chart 1.
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The investment value doctrine requires that the old bondholders be
given new securities so that the market value of their investment in
the enterprise does not change. Since that value was $95,000 before,
it must be $95,000 after as well. Thus, the old bondholders should
receive all of the new bonds plus 90 percent of the new preferred
stock, since the aggregate market value of the securities they would
then hold is $95,000. We may note that the old bondholders, who had
bonds with a face value of $100,000, have been paid with securities
whose face value equals, not $100,000, but $101,500. 69
The example now shifts to a Chapter X situation. In Chapter X
claims are measured by liquidation rights of the old securities and
payments by face value of the new securities as assigned by the court
out of the total reorganization value. An enterprise identical to the
initial enterprise in the Section 11 example enters Chapter X: The
market value of the bonds totals $95,000, and of common, $15,000.70
Let us say that the court determines the reorganization value to be
$120,000, out of which the bondholders have a liquidation-based claim
of $100,000. 7 1 For Stage One we posit no qualitative shift, hence no
change in the security structure. 72 The reorganized company will be
as illustrated in Table I, Chart 5, and the fair and equitable standard
will be satisfied if the bondholders are given new but qualitatively
identical bonds with a face value of $100,000. 73 Since there has been
no qualitative shift, the bonus rule, by its own definition, does not
apply. In this case we may note that the liquidation-based claim of
the old bondholders of $100,000 has been met by payment with se-
curities which, while having a face value of $100,000, have a market
value of $95,000.
4
Now the enterprise enters Stage Two. The court determines to re-
duce the interest payments the new corporation must make by shifting
the security structure of the enterprise in reorganization. It decides
69. See Table I. Chart 3.
70. The bondholders therefore have bonds with a liquidation claim, and a face value,
of $100,000. See Table I, Chart 4.
71. Since the reorganization value of the enterprise is $120,000, and the bondholder's
claim is $100,000, the residual value to the common is $20,000. See Table I, Chart 5.
72. Stage One could itself represent a complete Chapter X reorganization. Since the
reorganization value is $120,000, common stockholders will still be allowed to participate
in the reorganized enterprise; Stage One thus seems a rather undramatic construct in this
simplified example. In more complicated examples with a lower reorganization value,
the most important function of the first stage would be revealed: The enterprise value
would be insufficient to meet the liquidation-based claims of all classes. One or more
classes would be excluded and only the survivors would be considered in the Stage Two
calculations, which would nonetheless yield a result like that obtained under the invest-
ment value doctrine.
73. See Table I, Chart 7.
74. This follows from the fact that $100,000 face value of bonds has a going-concern
value of $95,000.
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that a structure of $52,000 face value of bonds, and $55,000 face value
of preferred is feasible. 75 The old bondholders, of course, still have
a liquidation claim of $100,000. Apart from the bonus rule, it is clear
that the Chapter X court considers the $100,000 claim satisfied with
$100,000 face value of new securities-that is to say, $52,000 face value
in new bonds and $48,000 face value in new preferred stock. The
market value of this $100,000 face value payment is $93,636.76
Chapter X theory, however, requires that a bonus is necessary as
a result of the qualitative shift and, indeed, when the two Chapter X
stages are compared, it is clear that a bonus is necessary in the second
case. 77 But the bonus need not be designed to give the old bondholders
securities with a market value of $100,000, their liquidation claim.
Rather, the first stage, where there was no qualitative shift, provides
the standard: the cash equivalent must be $95,000. To be as well off,
the old bondholders in the second case need to be given additional
preferred stock whose going-concern value equals $1,364. In face value
terms, the old bondholders must be given additional preferred with
a face value of $1,500:7 s this is the measure of the bonus. Consequent-
ly, the old bondholders in the second case, in order to receive a pay-
ment of $95,000 in cash equivalents, need to be given securities whose
face value equals $101,500, not $100,000, as was the situation in the
first case, where no qualitative shift took place. The $101,500 face
value payment is the same as resulted in the Section 11 example with
an identical company; Stage Two, it is apparent, may be implemented
by the Section 11 procedure. The two-stage process, with the second
stage being a recapitalization carried out under the doctrines of Sec-
tion 11, results in the same payment outcome as does the second
Chapter X example with the bonus rule.
79
There is no need for courts to apply the bonus rule with impre-
cision or with haphazard irregularities caused by a lack of method-
ology. The congruence in function of the bonus rule and the in-
vestment value doctrine 0 permits a congruence in application as well.
75. See Table I, Chart 6.
76. The going-concern value of the bonds used for payment is $50,000, while the going-
concern value of the preferred stock is 48/55ths of $50,000, or $43,636. See Table I, Chart 9.
77. See Table I, Charts 7, 8.
78. $1,500 is in the same ratio to the total face value of the preferred stock, $55,000,
as $1,364 is to the total going-concern value of the preferred stock, $50,000.
79. Both procedures-the current Chapter X process, and the two-stage process-respect,
in the first instance, the use of contractual liquidation rights to measure claims and the
use of reorganization value, along with face value, to measure payment. In Table I, com-
pare Chart 3 with Chart 9.
80. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-29 (1941)
(rationale for bonus rule); Eastern Gas 8- Fuel Associates, 30 S.E.C. 834, 914-15 (1950)
(rationale for investment value doctrine).
